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Abstract
This paper aims at contributing to the debate on whether unsolicited ratings are
strategically motivated. I present evidence from the sovereign debt market that strate-
gic motivation is not necessarily behind the patterns that we see in the data and
propose a model of credit ratings and ancillary services that abstracts from strate-
gic considerations. In my model, borrowers with different unobservable characteristics
select themselves into different solicitation groups. In equilibrium, the model can gen-
erate either a negative or a positive selection on unsolicited ratings, depending on the
share of unsolicited ratings in a given market. The economic mechanism analyzed in
this paper implies a “natural” degree of market selection which is not associated to
strategic motivation.
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1 Introduction
Unsolicited ratings are opinions about the creditworthiness of the borrower that are not
initiated nor paid for by the issuer. Standard and Poor’s (S&P) has been issuing unsolicited
ratings since 1996. Moody’s and Fitch - the other two biggest rating agencies - have been
doing it as well.1 Since the majority of the rating agencies (CRAs) receive compensation
from the issuer, one could wonder why the rating agencies would want to issue a rating for
which they do not receive fees.
Fulghieri et al. (2014) propose a strategic motivation for unsolicited ratings. They argue
that unsolicited ratings can be used as threat to pressure issuers towards solicitation. This
model implies that unsolicited ratings have to be lower on average than solicited ones and
this fact is consistent with the empirical literature.2
Further evidence on the difference between solicited and unsolicited ratings is brought
by Bannier et al. (2010). They compare the ex-post default probabilities of similar non-U.S.
borrowers with solicited and unsolicited S&P ratings between January 1996 and December
2006 and find that, conditional on a rating, default probabilities are different across the two
groups. The unsolicited rating group has lower default rates, which might be an indication
that rating agencies choose to rate those borrowers more strictly compared to solicited ones.
Understanding whether lower unsolicited ratings are motivated by strategic considera-
tions of the rating agencies is important for policy. For example, the rating agency Moody’s
had been subjected to an antitrust investigation in 1996 by America’s Justice Department,
which suspected that the agency’s practice of issuing unsolicited ratings on companies might
be “a way to force them to pay up for the full service” (The Economist, 2001).
In this paper, I argue that lower average unsolicited rating grades and a lower probability
of default in unsolicited ratings vis-a`-vis the same solicited ratings do not necessarily imply
the strategic use of lower ratings by the rating agencies. Different types of firms might
select themselves into soliciting or not soliciting ratings depending on their characteristics.
For example, more solvent firms may reasonably expect higher grades on average and thus
have more incentives to solicit a rating. Unsolicited ratings are, therefore, more likely to be
assigned to lower quality firms.
An argument against the strategic motivation of the CRA for giving unsolicited ratings
is the fact that, in the sovereign market, unsolicited ratings have higher grades - not lower
- than solicited ones. Figure 1 reports the histograms of Moody’s unsolicited and solicited
1At least since 2000 and 2001, respectively, Moody’s and Fitch have recognised issuing unsolicited rat-
ings (Behr and Guettler, 2008) but they were possibly doing it before that.
2Evidence that unsolicited ratings are associated with lower grades is broad in the empirical litera-
ture (Poon and Firth, 2005; Poon and Chan, 2010; Van Roy, 2013).
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sovereign grades between 2010 and 2015. The distribution of unsolicited ratings has more
weight to higher grades compared to that of solicited ratings. The unconditional mean of
Figure 1: Histogram of solicited versus unsolicited rating grades. Source: Moody’s, 2010
-2015.
solicited sovereign ratings is a Baa2 grade while that of unsolicited ratings is on average an A2
grade.3 A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test of the difference in means is significantly different
from zero as can be seen in table 1. The median values are also statistically different. More
generally, equality of the distribution functions is rejected at the 99% confidence using a
two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S statistic: 0.4348).
Table 1: Differences between sovereign mean and median grades for solicited and unsolicited
ratings. Source: Moody’s, 2010 -2015.
difference in value t-statistic p-value
Mean −3.89 −5.31 0.0000
Median −8 20.46 0.0000
The fact that unsolicited sovereign ratings are higher on average calls for a model of
market self-selection that is able to produce not only a downward bias but also an upward
one, like the one I present here.
Credit rating agencies provide as well “ancillary services”, a business that has been grow-
ing since the late 90s. Ancillary services “comprise market forecasts, estimates of economic
3Moody’s rating scale is, in decreasing order of credit quality: Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, Caa, Ca, C.
Moody’s adds numerical modifiers 1, 2, and 3 to each rating grade from Aa through Caa.
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Figure 2: Moody’s revenues by line of business from 2000 to 2007.
Figure 3: Moody’s revenues by line of business from 2006 to 2015.
trends, pricing analysis and other general data analysis as well as related distribution ser-
vices” (ESMA, 2013). Since 2000 the share of revenues from the rating business went from a
maximum of 90% (in 2002) to 70% (in 2015) versus an increasing share of ancillary services
that reaches up to 30% (see figures 2 and 3). An example of ancillary service consists in
providing the borrower with a forecast of the rating. Moody’s Rating Assessment Service
was launched in 2000 and charges a company 75.000 euros to know what its credit rating
would be if it solicited one (The Economist, 2001). Feedback is provided only to the issuer
and assessments are confidential until the issuer decides to announce them publicly. S&P
also offers a similar service: the Ratings Evaluation System.
Literature. Fulghieri et al. (2014) introduce the first model of strategic motivation for
unsolicited ratings. They see unsolicited ratings as an off-equilibrium threat, which is credible
because it shows that the CRA fights the temptation to issue inflated ratings. Byoun (2014)
presents a model of ratings where the existence of unsolicited ratings in equilibrium is not
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strategically motivated, it is granted by the assumption that the CRA has to produce a
rating for each firm. In my model, rating agencies are interested in issuing unsolicited
ratings because it improves visibility, allowing the CRA to charge higher fees on solicited
ratings.
There is ample empirical evidence regarding the properties of unsolicited ratings (Poon
and Firth, 2005; Poon and Chan, 2010; Van Roy, 2013; Bannier et al., 2010; Gan, 2004).
None of them studies sovereign unsolicited ratings. As we will see below, descriptive statis-
tics evidence indicate that, contrary to what has been found in other markets, unsolicited
sovereign ratings have higher grades and are associated with lower bond yields compared to
solicited ones. This contrasts with what has been found in the previous literature for banks,
corporations and insurance companies (Behr and Guettler, 2008; Byoun, 2014; Klusak et al.,
2015).
This paper sheds light on the relationship between different services provided by the
rating agency. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that considers the ratings
and the ancillary services jointly. The business of ancillary services has received attention
from the regulators, who advocated more transparency in order to avoid conflicts of interest.4
Here I focus on their effect in the selection that arises in the market.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section I present some stylised facts
about the sovereign unsolicited ratings. In section 3, I set up a model of borrowing under
incomplete information where the credit rating agencies may issue ratings, solicited as well
as unsolicited, and provide ancillary services. I solve for the equilibrium, characterise the
equilibrium outcomes and present the relationship to the empirical facts. Section 4 concludes.
2 Stylized facts about sovereign ratings
2.1 Unsolicited sovereign ratings are more frequent than in other
markets
Unsolicited ratings are not issued homogeneously across market segments nor across regions.
In 2000, the proportion of unsolicited ratings with respect to the total number of outstanding
ratings varied between 6% and 27% in industrial countries, depending on rating agency and
region (Bannier et al., 2010). In the US, unsolicited ratings are rare. In the European
Union they are more numerous, especially in the segment of sovereign and public finance.
Table 2 reports the number of ratings issued by each rating agency by solicitation status
4Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies, amended by Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013.
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and for each market segment. In 2012, 12.24% of the sovereign and public finance ratings
by the three biggest rating agencies in the EU was unsolicited, while only 4.95% of the
corporate ratings, 3.33% of the financial and insurance institutions and 0% of the structured
finance ratings (ESMA, 2013). The agencies Moody’s and S&P gave in 2012 more unsolicited
Fitch Moody’s S&P
Corporate
Solicited
518 760 951
82.48% 99.48% 99.79%
Unsolicited
110 4 2
17.52% 0.52% 0.21%
Financials and Insurance
Solicited
597 542 1006
97.07% 99.82% 94.82%
Unsolicited
18 1 55
2.93% 0.18% 5.18%
Sovereign and Public Finance
Solicited
296 232 189
83.38% 93.93% 87.91%
Unsolicited
59 15 26
16.62% 6.07% 12.09%
Structured Finance
Solicited
4861 4438 4705
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Unsolicited
0 0 0
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Table 2: Ratings by solicitation status for different market segments in the EU in 2012.
Source: ESMA.
rating to sovereigns than to other categories and Fitch to both sovereigns and corporates.
The majority of the other smaller rating agencies specialize in issuing only solicited or only
unsolicited ratings (ESMA, 2013).
For the agency Moody’s, the fraction of sovereigns that receive an unsolicited rating are
distributed by grade as follows: 10.9% are high grades (investment grade) and 4.15% are low
grades (below investment grade) as can be read from table 3.
Table 3: Fraction of sovereigns that receive an unsolicited rating by rating grade (Moody’s,
2010-2015).
Unsolicited Observations
Grade Baa3 or above 10.9% 412
Grade below Baa3 4.15% 313
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2.2 Unsolicited sovereign ratings are higher than solicited ones
In a sample of all the sovereign ratings issued by Moody’s between 2010 and 2015,5 I trans-
lated the rating grades into a numerical scale that goes from 1 (grade C) to 21 (grade AAA).
If we control for some observable characteristics of the sovereigns (current account, debt over
GDP, primary deficit, GDP per capita, inflation, direct investment and a set of regional and
year dummies), having an unsolicited rating improves the rating grade by almost one and a
half points with respect to a similar country that has paid for its rating. From a rating of
Baa2, this would imply an upgrade to A3. The specification is similar to that of Gan (2004)
and Van Roy (2013):
Ratingi,t = Xi,tβ + δSolicitationi,t + i,t (1)
but including time (year) as well as region (country) variation, where Solicitation is a dummy
variable for the solicitation status that takes value 0 if the rating is solicited and 1 if it is
unsolicited. Table 4 presents the estimated coefficient δˆ, which is positive and significant at
the 1% level.
The first column does not include fixed effects. The estimated positive effect of receiving
on unsolicited rating becomes larger and more significant once you include year fixed effects
(column 2), country fixed effects (column 3) or both (column 4). The average rating grade
is higher for unsolicited sovereign ratings.
Is this effect homogeneous along the rating scale? Table 5 reports three quantile regres-
sions. The first column refers to the effect of solicitation on the rating grade for the first
quartile (0.25) and its effect is the least significant and the smallest. The higher the rating
grades (columns 2 and 3), the more sizeable the positive effect of unsolicited ratings.
Let us see which countries are likely to receive unsolicited ratings. The unconditional
probability for an individual country of obtaining an unsolicited rating is 7.49% in my sample.
It is more likely, though, for countries with a higher rating grade, more outstanding public
debt over GDP and a higher GDP per capita. Controlling for other factors, being in the
region of Europe or East Asia makes it less likely that a suitable candidate receives an
unsolicited rating. This might be due to the fact that there are more countries in those
regions that could potentially be candidates.
In order to see whether Moody’s changed its criteria for rating countries unsolicitedly
over time, I predicted the estimated probability that a country of certain characteristics
receives an unsolicited rating for each year between 2010 and 2015.6 As expected, countries
rated unsolicitedly had a higher predicted probability of receiving an unsolicited rating. But
5The sample is obtained from reading the internal documents published by Moody’s (“Unsolicited Ratings
List”) from its earliest release in September, 6 2010 to the latest in December 30, 2015.
6See appendix A.
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Table 4: OLS with robust standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rating grade Rating grade Rating grade Rating grade
Solicitation dummy 0.939* 1.489*** 0.984** 1.469***
(0.498) (0.512) (0.489) (0.506)
Current account 0.135*** 0.128*** 0.134*** 0.128***
(0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0139) (0.0139)
Debt -0.0177*** -0.0214*** -0.0172*** -0.0207***
(0.00427) (0.00437) (0.00425) (0.00434)
Primary deficit -0.211*** -0.196*** -0.209*** -0.194***
(0.0320) (0.0294) (0.0322) (0.0296)
GDP per capita 0.000152*** 0.000143*** 0.000151*** 0.000143***
(0.00000924) (0.00000955) (0.00000920) (0.00000956)
Inflation -0.151*** -0.145*** -0.156*** -0.150***
(0.0201) (0.0195) (0.0221) (0.0216)
Direct investment 0.136*** 0.121*** 0.135*** 0.119***
(0.0199) (0.0215) (0.0197) (0.0214)
Region FE no yes no yes
Time FE no no yes yes
N 669 669 669 669
R-square 0.676 0.690 0.682 0.695
F 126.0 418.5 72.17 198.9
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
other countries with solicited ratings were just as likely or more to receive an unsolicited
rating, for example Austria, Belgium, Norway, Botswana, South Africa and Ghana. You can
find the complete list of the sovereign unsolicited ratings in the first column in appendix B.
In the second column there is the list of sovereigns with a predicted probability of receiving
an unsolicited rating higher than the average predicted probability of the sovereigns in the
first column. First, in 2010 and 2011, the profile were top quality sovereign borrowers in
Europe. Later on, as the competition across CRAs got increasingly intense and Africa started
issuing international debt more frequently, some relatively stable economies in that continent
became natural candidates for unsolicited ratings as well.
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Table 5: Quantile regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Rating grade Rating grade Rating grade
Solicitation dummy 0.775* 1.371*** 1.536***
(0.409) (0.461) (0.451)
Current account 0.109*** 0.142*** 0.120***
(0.0134) (0.0161) (0.0157)
Debt -0.0177*** -0.0241*** -0.0225***
(0.00331) (0.00370) (0.00415)
Primary deficit -0.138*** -0.165*** -0.179***
(0.0271) (0.0302) (0.0245)
GDP per capita 0.000127*** 0.000175*** 0.000196***
(0.00000808) (0.00000725) (0.00000620)
Inflation -0.202*** -0.134*** -0.134***
(0.0139) (0.0181) (0.0216)
Direct investment 0.107*** 0.155*** 0.156***
(0.0212) (0.0208) (0.0215)
Region FE yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes
N 669 669 669
Quantile 0.25 0.50 0.75
Residual degree freedom 651 651 651
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
2.3 Unsolicited sovereign ratings have lower associated debt yields
I merged the sample of Moody’s unsolicited ratings between November 2010 and December
2015 with the long-term sovereign yields at the end of the month for the same period. I also
have data on the outlook (negative, neutral or positive) at the end of the month. I use the
following specification:
Sovereign Y ieldsi,t = Xi,tβ + λSolicitationi,t + ui,t (2)
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and report the results in table 6. In a linear regression of the yields on the solicitation
dummy variable (and additional controls), I find that the unsolicited status of a rating grade
represents an average decrease of 3.8 percentage points in the sovereign yields compared to
the solicited status. Unsolicited ratings are associated with an improvement in the price of
Table 6: OLS with robust standard errors
(1) (2) (3)
Sovereign yields Sovereign yields Sovereign yields
Solicitation dummy -3.023*** -3.023*** -3.823***
(0.127) (0.125) (0.126)
Rating -0.314*** -0.379*** -0.745***
(0.0626) (0.0623) (0.198)
Positive outlook no -2.600*** -0.223
(0.398) (0.195)
Negative outlook no 1.187*** 0.277
(0.338) (0.256)
Country FE yes yes yes
Month FE yes yes yes
Country-Year FE no no yes
N 1837 1837 1837
R-square 0.768 0.771 0.923
F 138.8 145.6 717.1
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
debt higher than that of a one point higher rating grade (0.75) or a better outlook (0.22)7
Thus, the market charges a lower risk premium to bonds from issuers with high unsolicited
rating grades than to bonds from issuers with the same solicited grades. For example, a
triple A unsolicited borrower pays on average 1.67, whereas a triple A solicited one pays an
average yield of 2.43.
How good are the ratings at explaining the sovereign yields? The correlation between
sovereign yields and sovereign ratings is −0.69, both for solicited as well as for unsolicited
ratings. Year by year the correlation can be found in figure 4 and it is shown to be not
significantly different for the groups of solicited and unsolicited ratings. Hence, there is no
7The outlook becomes insignificant in my last specification once all controls have been introduced.
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Figure 4: Confidence intervals for the correlation between sovereign yields and ratings by
Moody’s from 2010 to 2015 separated by solicitation status.
evidence that the rating agencies perform better at predicting the sovereign yields in any
particular category.
3 Model
A crucial component of the model will be market selection. I hence need to introduce
borrowers’ heterogeneity. For simplicity I assume there are only two types of borrowers, one
with a higher probability to default than the other. The probability to default is ex-ante
not observable. But the CRA can obtain information about it at a cost. This cost can be
interpreted as the analyst wage to study the data and produce a rating. The CRA incurs
this cost every time they have to come up with a rating, regardless of whether they are
compensated for it or not.
Unsolicited ratings are a way to increase the visibility of a rating agency. According
to Byoun and Shin (2012),“unsolicited ratings are also considered a means of raising a
rating agency’s profile in particular countries: that is, rating agencies provide unsolicited
ratings to investors in an attempt to gain a competitive advantage over those who do not
assign unsolicited rating”. As an agency becomes known it will be more likely approached
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by some client to request its services. Clearly, borrowers who are unaware of the existence of
a particular rating agency are not going to ask for a solicited rating there. Even if a rating
agency is known already, producing more ratings or more recent ratings may be a way to
let the market know about your technology and advertise your accuracy. A more standard
rating is easier for the lenders to interpret and more attractive when trying to attract funds.
For instance, the company FCE Bank plc replies to an ESMA call for evidence on the
“Competition, choice and conflicts of interest in the credit rating industry” that “in order
to protect and provide confidence to our investors, we tend to select the market accepted
CRAs.” (ESMA, 2015).
In the previous section we saw evidence that 1) in the sovereign market unsolicited rat-
ings are more numerous, 2) unsolicited sovereign ratings have higher grades than solicited
sovereign ratings and 3) unsolicited ratings are associated with lower debt yields, that is,
sovereigns with unsolicited ratings pay less for issuing debt than others with the same grade
but solicited ratings. Current theories about the existence of unsolicited ratings cannot ac-
count for these facts. Unsolicited ratings are generally modelled as a punishment in the form
of downward biased ratings, which contradicts evidence 2 and 3. Or they can be an option
that only some borrowers face: those not confident enough to ask for a rating previously. I
present an economic mechanism that may account for these facts by changing two assump-
tions: the first one is the timing, the CRA chooses whether to assign an unsolicited rating
before the borrower decides if it solicits one. The second assumption is about the beliefs in
the case of unsolicited ratings: I assume the borrowers do not expect the CRA to give them
a bad rating if the CRA knows this information is untrue.
My model gives rise to two possible equilibria as a function of some parameters: one
where unsolicited ratings are associated with lower grades and another one where they are
associated with higher grades. In what follows, the determinants of each of these equilibria
will become clear.
3.1 Basic economic environment
Borrowers can be of two types i ∈ {A,B} with shares θ and 1− θ. Each borrower of type i
gets indebted for a fixed amount D. The future gross return is R˜ = R with probability λi
and R˜ = r with probability 1 − λi, where R > D > r > 0. Since the borrower has limited
liability, type i’s probability of default is 1− λi, where 1 ≥ λA > λB > 0.
Lenders do not know the borrower’s type. They are risk neutral with discount factor β.
Lenders compete on debt prices a` la Bertrand, making zero expected profits. They charge a
price q for lending D, taking into account the expected probability of default, which will be
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specified later. For a pair (q,D), the borrower’s expected payoff equals qD + Ei{R˜} − λiD,
where Ei{R˜} := λiR + (1− λi)r.
In the economy, there exists a credit rating agency (CRA) which has access to costly
private information about the borrower’s type. By paying a cost c, the CRA receives the
random signal σ = {H,L}: if the country is of type A, the CRA receives the H signal with
probability 1 while, if the country is of type B, the H signal is received with probability
p < 1. The rating grade consists of a truthful report on the signal received and is denoted
by g ∈ {H,L}.
A borrower can choose to solicit a rating to the agency before issuing debt. The benefit
of doing so is that a rating can give information to the market and improve the debt price q
that the lenders are willing to offer. The rating agency charges a fee φ for issuing solicited
ratings.
The CRA can also issue unsolicited ratings. Unsolicited ratings are free of charge. As
we will see, the CRA benefits from unsolicited ratings because they affect the fee that can
be charged for a rating. I assume that when a CRA issues more ratings (either solicited or
unsolicited), it has a higher visibility and/ or improves its bargaining power with respect
to the borrower. Therefore, unsolicited ratings allow the agency to charge higher fees for
solicited ratings. I assume the following functional form: φ(D, γ) = α1+α2γD. For α1, α2 >
0 fees are increasing in the amount of debt issued and in the fraction of unsolicited ratings
assigned.
The CRA also provides ancillary services for a fee χ. Ancillary services give the borrower
the opportunity to learn about the CRA’s private signal and to veto the revelation of that
information.8 The rating assesment m = {h, l} is an imperfect forecast of the rating signal
g and it is summarized in figure 5. An assesment m = h is received with probability 1
2
and
m = l with probability 1
2
. Conditional on receiving a positive assesment, type B receives a
rating grade H with probability p+ , and L with the complementary probability 1− p− ,
whereas conditional on a negative assesment a rating grade H is given with probability p− 
and L with probability 1 − p + . There is no uncertainty about type A rating, it receives
H with probability 1. Assume  > 0 and  < 1 − p. These probabilities can be seen as
posteriors and the technology of information acquisition is the same in both cases.
Additionally, in the ancillary services contract, the agency commits not to issue an un-
solicited rating if the borrower does not solicit one.
Assume that a fraction ξ of borrowers do not enter the game; they access the market
8Ancillary services can play several roles: for instance, reducing the uncertainty about the outcome of
the rating process for the borrowers or improving the transmission of information between the borrower and
the rating agency. On top of that, confidentiality is an essential element of some of these services that are
recently provided by the CRAs.
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Figure 5: Ancillary services assesment.
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issuing unrated debt. This assumption guarantees that the g = L rating, which is fully
revealing of a B type, is perceived to be worse than no rating g = 0. Having a low rating
or being downgraded is known to have an effect in the price of debt. It is reasonable that
borrowers expect the market to judge them more harshly if they have been given a bad
rating than if they have none. In the absence of bad news they could expect the lenders
to have some uncertainty about their credit standing, which is even more likely to happen
in the case where more types could be mistaken for one another. As unrated countries are
a pool of different borrowers that do not access the rating services, being unrated could be
perceived to be better than having a low rating.9
The timing is the following:
1. In stage t = 0, the borrower decides whether to buy ancillary services at cost χ. Denote
this decision by a ∈ {0, 1}.
2. If the borrower is a client of ancillary services, in stage t = 1, it receives a non-binding
assessment about the rating grade, which can be m = h or m = l. In stage t = 2,
borrowers choose whether to solicit and pay the fee φ(D, γ) for a rating: s = {0, 1}.
Denote as g = 0 the case in which the borrower remains unrated.
3. If the borrower is not a client of ancillary services, in stage t = 1, the rating agency
may issue an unsolicited rating. γ ∈ [0, 1] represents the fraction of unsolicited ratings
issued. After deciding to issue an unsolicited rating, the signal σ = {H,L} is received.
In stage t = 2, borrowers that did not receive an unsolicited rating have the option
to solicit one, s = {0, 1}. Note that a borrower cannot have both a solicited and
unsolicited rating.
9As a matter of fact, there is a small but growing number of borrowers which decide to issue debt in
the international debt market without a rating. They have accounted for about 10 per cent of the European
corporate bond market in recent years and usually they could be classified as investment, or near-investment
grade (Bolger and Wigglesworth, 2014).
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The lenders observe the choices of the borrower and those of the rating agency, except for
the existence of ancillary services, which is kept confidential between the borrower and the
CRA. To sum up, the borrower can have a rating, g = H or g = L, or none, g = 0. Ratings
can be either solicited or unsolicited but not both of them.
3.2 CRA problem
The CRA takes two actions: in t = 1 it decides the fraction γ of unsolicited rating to non-
clients of ancillary services10 and, in t = 2, it issues a solicited rating if it has been asked for
one. The truth-telling assumption implies that the grade report will be either the signal the
CRA received or none. Denote the rating grade report g(a, u, s, σ), where the first element
corresponds to the choice of ancillary services, the second represents the existence of an
unsolicited rating, the third of a solicited one and the last element is the signal about the
creditworthiness of the borrower available to the CRA. Depending on those elements, the
rule for assigning a rating grade is the following:
g∗(1, 0, 1, σ) = σ, g∗(1, 0, 0, σ) = 0, (3)
g∗(0, 0, 1, σ) = σ, g∗(0, 1, 0, σ) = σ (4)
and g∗(0, 0, 0, σ) = 0. (5)
When the borrower is a client of ancillary services, a = 1, it may request a rating or not, in
which case it won’t receive an unsolicited one. If the borrower is not a client, a = 0, it may
request a rating and, if not, it may receive on unsolicited one or it may also be unrated.
In t = 1 the CRA problem is the following:
max
γ
−γc+ [(1− γ)f ∗(γ) (φ(D, γ)− c)] , (6)
where f ∗(γ) is the fraction of borrowers that solicit a rating in equilibrium. The CRA chooses
the proportion of unsolicited ratings taking into account that each rating has a cost c today
and it also has an effect in the next stage: on the one hand, it crowds out solicited ratings,
as a borrower cannot have both a solicited and unsolicited rating, hence only 1−γ borrowers
are susceptible to solicit a rating afterwards; on the other hand, it increases the fees that
can be charged for those solicited ratings. Therefore, γ∗ is, as well, the probability that a
non-client of ancillary services gets an unsolicited rating.
10Recall that clients of ancillary services do not receive unsolicited ratings.
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3.3 Lenders’ problem
Lenders lend the amount qD to the borrower and receive D at the end of the game if there
is no default. In case of default, there is no partial repayment. The lender profit function is:
Π = −qD + β [µλAD + (1− µ)λBD] , (7)
where µ = µ(s, g) are the lenders’ beliefs that the borrower is of type A. Beliefs depend
on what the lender observes about the borrowers creditworthiness: the solicitation statute
and the rating grade. As a result of imposing the zero-profit condition, the price function
satisfies:
q(µ) = β[µλA + (1− µ)λB]. (8)
The value µ(0, 0) represents the lenders’ beliefs when they see no rating for some borrower,
µ(0, H) and µ(0, L) the lenders see an unsolicited rating of H or L, respectively.
3.4 Borrower’s problem
The borrower faces two problems: whether to buy ancillary services at t = 0 and whether
to solicit a rating at t = 2. The borrower’s payoff, depending on its rating, is the following:
• If the borrower buys ancillary services and it also solicits a rating: q(µ)D + λi(R −
D) + (1 − λi)r − φ(D, γ) − χ, where the first term is the amount of borrowing at
price q(µ) = q(1, g), the second and third terms are the net revenues weighted by the
repayment probabilities and the last two terms are the fee for solicitation and ancillary
services, respectively.
• If the borrower solicits a rating but does not buy ancillary services, it saves on the
amount of ancillary fees: q(1, g)D + λi(R−D) + (1− λi)r − φ(D, γ).
• A borrower that does not buy ancillary services may receive an unsolicited rating with
an associated payoff of q(0, g)D + λi(R − D) + (1 − λi)r, where the price of debt is
q(0, g) and the borrower does not incur in any fees.
• Finally, if the borrower is unrated the payoff equals q(0, 0)D + λi(R −D) + (1− λi)r
if it did not buy ancillary services or q(0, 0)D + λi(R−D) + (1− λi)r − χ if it did.
3.5 Equilibrium
I solve using the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
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Definition 3.1. Given the CRA rule of g∗(a, u, s, σ), a symmetric equilibrium is a γ∗, a
strategy for the borrower:
{a∗, s∗} : {A,B} → {0, 1} × {0, 1}, (9)
where a∗(i) is the choice of ancillary services and s∗ (i, a(i)) is the rating solicitation, a
strategy for the lender about the debt price q∗(s, g) : {0, 1} × {H,L, 0} → R+ and a system
of beliefs µ∗(s, g) : {0, 1} × {H,L, 0} → [0, 1] about the borrower being type A, such that:
• γ∗ maximises the CRA profit function (6) and f ∗(γ) is consistent with the borrower’s
strategy.
• The strategy profile is sequentially rational given the beliefs and γ∗.
• The beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
3.6 Model without ancillary services
Let us first solve the model without ancillary services as a benchmark. The game starts at
t = 1. All the other modeling assumptions stay the same.
Proposition 3.1. A rule of g∗(u, s, σ): g∗(0, 1, σ) = σ, g∗(1, 0, σ) = σ and g∗(0, 0, σ) = 0,
the strategies s∗(A) = 1, s∗(B) = 0, q∗(µ) = µλA + (1 − µ)λB and γ∗ = (1−θ)c+θα1−2θα2D + 12
constitute an equilibrium of the model without ancillary services given the following beliefs
µ(s, g): µ(s, L) = 0∀ s, µ(1, H) = 1,
µ(0, H) =
1 w. prob. θθ+(1−θ)p0 w. prob. (1−θ)p
θ+(1−θ)p
and
µ(0, 0) =
1 w. prob.
θξ
θξ+(1−θ)(1+γ(ξ−1))
0 w. prob. (1−θ)(1+γ(ξ−1))
θξ+(1−θ)(1+γ(ξ−1)) .
The CRA assigns a proportion γ∗ of unsolicited ratings to both type A and type B
borrowers in order to maximise its profit function (6) in t = 1:
max
γ
−γc+ (1− γ)θ [φ(D, γ)− c] .
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Substituting the functional form of φ(D, γ) and solving the maximization problem, we obtain
the first order condition:
−c− θ(α1 + α2γD) + θ(1− γ)α2D + θc = 0.
Rearranging we find an expression for the optimal fraction of unsolicited ratings that the
CRA issues:
γ∗ =
(1− θ)c+ θα1
−2θα2D +
1
2
. (10)
Since γ′(D) > 0 if α1 > c, γ∗ is increasing in the amount of debt.
For condition φ > φ > φ¯11 type A prefers to solicit a rating rather than remaining
unrated, if they are not given an unsolicited one, while type B does not. Conditions state
that φ in equilibrium has to stay within some upper and lower bounds: the bounds depend
on D, γ∗, θ, λA and λB. A fee too high would discourage even the best borrowers to ask for
a rating.
Type A can have either a solicited or unsolicited H rating and a fraction ξ is unrated
by assumption. If type A were allowed to solicit a rating after an unsolicited one they may
choose to do so. The reason is the price of debt is better for solicited ratings for the same
H grade. We simplify away from this possibility but this behaviour is something we might
observe. Type B can have an H unsolicited rating, L unsolicited rating or no rating. There
are no grade L solicited ratings. Thus, unsolicited ratings have lower grades on average.
Type A knows that it is more likely to receive an H rating, so it has an incentive to pay
the fee for a solicited rating. Type B, on the contrary, has a lower probability p to receive an
H rating and a high probability to receive an L rating, which bears a higher risk premium
than an absence of rating. The fact that higher quality borrowers are more inclined to get
rated is a well-known result in the literature (Lizzeri, 1999; Mathis et al., 2009; Fulghieri
et al., 2014).
3.7 Introducing ancillary services
Proposition 3.2. For g∗(a, u, s, σ) given by equations (3)-(5), the strategies a∗(A) = 0, a∗(B) =
1, s∗(A, 0) = 1, s∗(B, 0) = 0, s∗(A, 1) = 1, s∗(B, 1) = 1 if m = h and 0 if m = l,
q∗(µ) = µλA + (1 − µ)λB and γ∗ that solves problem (6) constitute an equilibrium of the
11See Appendix C for a proof.
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model given the following beliefs: µ(0, H) = 1, µ(0, L) = 0, µ(1, L) = 0,
µ(1, H) =
1 w. prob.
2θ(1−γ)
2θ(1−γ)+(1−θ)(p+)
0 w. prob. (1−θ)(p+)
2θ(1−γ)+(1−θ)(p+)
and
µ(0, 0) =
1 w. prob.
2θξ
2θξ+(1−θ)(ξ+1)
0 w. prob. (1−θ)(ξ+1)
2θξ+(1−θ)(ξ+1)
if γ > γ¯.
The CRA assigns a proportion γ∗ of unsolicited H ratings to type A borrowers. Type B
borrowers enter a contract of ancillary services and avoid receiving unsolicited ratings. They
can either have a solicited H or L rating, after having observed the assessment m = h, or no
rating, after having observed the assessment m = l. A fraction ξ of borrowers is unrated by
assumption. Type A borrowers who are neither unrated nor received an unsolicited rating,
solicit and receive an H rating. There are no grade L unsolicited ratings, as the type B
borrowers that would be subject to receiving one prefer to pay for ancillary services and veto
that possibility. Hence, unsolicited ratings have higher grades on average. There are two
thresholds values φ¯ and φ12 such that: for φ > φ and φ < φ¯, s∗(A, a) = 1 ∀a and s∗(B, 0) = 0,
s∗(B, 1) = 1 if m = h and 0 if m = l.
Type A prefers to solicit a rating whenever φ < φ¯, whether they are clients of ancillary
services or not. Their incentives to solicit are high, because the probability of getting a high
rating is large, as long as the price of ratings is sufficiently low. Type B, on the contrary,
prefers not to solicit a rating unless they are given a strong signal, a positive assessment, that
the rating will be high. That is, if the fees are high enough with respect to the probability
p of being given an H rating.
The CRA problem (6) can be rewritten in the following way:
max
γ
−γc+ (1− γ)θ [φ(D, γ)− c] + 1
2
(1− θ) [φ(D, γ)− c] . (11)
Plugging in the functional form of φ(D, γ) and solving for γ:
γ∗ =
(1− θ)c+ θα1
−2θα2D +
1
2
(
1
2
+
1
2θ
)
, (12)
12The thresholds depend on the parameters of the model and a formal derivation can be found in ap-
pendix D.
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where the first two terms coincide with the expression for the optimal fraction of unsolicited
ratings in the model without ancillary services and the term in parenthesis, which is > 1 for
0 > θ > 1, represents the additional incentive to issue unsolicited ratings due to the gains
coming from the clients of ancillary services.
For a∗(B) = 1,
Proposition 3.3. Provided γ is high enough, type B prefers to buy ancillary services for a
fee χ and obtain a rating H with probability p and no rating g = 0 with probability 1−p than
risk getting an unsolicited H rating with probability γp and L with probability γ(1− p).
The existence of this equilibrium depends on the value of γ:
γ > γ¯ :=
βG(θ, ξ, λA, λB) +
α1
2
+ χ
2βG(θ, ξ, λA, λB)− α2D . (13)
where G(θ, ξ, λA, λB) =
2θξλA+(1−θ)(ξ+1)λB
2θξ+(1−θ)(ξ+1) . Note that a
∗(A) = 0 is always true13. If type
A does not ask for ancillary services it might get an unsolicited H rating or a solicited H
rating. With ancillary services the outcome is always a solicited H rating but at the extra
cost of having to pay the fee χ.
In this set-up, unsolicited H ratings are assigned only to A types, therefore they are
fully revealing of the high quality type. This confirms equilibrium beliefs in proposition 3.2.
Off-equilibrium beliefs µ(0, L) are set equal to 0.
Since unsolicited H ratings are assigned only to A types but solicited H ratings can be
assigned to A and B types, we expect to see a market premium in the price of debt of high
unsolicited ratings with respect to solicited.
Note that γ is a choice of the rating agency that is described by the expression (12).
When γ is low, type B does not choose ancillary services and the equilibrium outcome is
similar to the one described in the solution to the model without ancillary services.
Proposition 3.4. For g∗(a, u, s, σ) given by equations (3)-(5), the strategies a∗(A) = 0, a∗(B) =
0, s∗(A, 0) = 1, s∗(B, 0) = 0, s∗(A, 1) = 1, s∗(B, 1) = 1 if m = h and 0 if m = l,
q∗(µ) = µλA + (1 − µ)λB and γ∗ that solves problem (6) constitute an equilibrium of the
model given the following beliefs: µ(s, g): µ(s, L) = 0∀ s, µ(1, H) = 1,
µ(0, H) =
1 w. prob. θθ+(1−θ)p0 w. prob. (1−θ)p
θ+(1−θ)p
13For a∗(A) = 0: γq(0, H)D+(1−γ) [q(1, H)D − φ(γ,D)] > 12q(1, H)D+ 12q(1, H)D−φ(γ,D)−χ. Since
q(0, H) > q(1, H), the statement is always true.
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and
µ(0, 0) =
1 w. prob.
θξ
θξ+(1−θ)(1+γ(ξ−1))
0 w. prob. (1−θ)(1+γ(ξ−1))
θξ+(1−θ)(1+γ(ξ−1))
if γ ≤ γ¯.
Thus, all grade H solicited ratings are assigned to type A borrowers whereas grade
H unsolicited ratings can be given to type A or B with different probabilities. Grade L
unsolicited ratings are assigned to type B borrowers. Finally, unrated borrowers can be
either type A or B. This confirms equilibrium beliefs in proposition 3.4. Off-equilibrium
beliefs µ(1, L) are free to be [0, 1], in this case, they are equal to 0.
3.8 Comparative statics
Some parameters affect the determination of the equilibrium.
• The amount of debt issued by a given borrower category or in a given market segment
(D). D affects the fraction of borrowers susceptible to receive an unsolicited rating:
since γ′(D) > 0, the higher the amount of debt in a given market or whenever the
borrowers issue more debt, the more incentives the CRA has to assign unsolicited
ratings. This is because the benefits from increased fees in the future - due to the
high debt - more than compensate for the costs of issuing unsolicitedly. The CRA has
incentives to increase their revenues when those are the largest, as it is the case when
there is a lot of debt to intermediate.
Suppose there are two equilibrium probabilities of issuing an unsolicited rating, γ∗1 and
γ∗2 , where γ
∗
1 < γ¯ < γ
∗
2 . Recall that γ¯ is the threshold of γ that makes type B want to
buy ancillary services as defined in equation (13). An increase from γ∗1 to γ
∗
2 makes type
B willing to buy ancillary services in order to avoid a more likely unsolicited rating.
Therefore, the equilibrium changes from one without equilibrium ancillary services and
lower grades unsolicited ratings to one with equilibrium ancillary services and higher
grades unsolicited ratings.
• The ex-ante market perception about the creditworthiness of a borrower (θ). θ affects
the conditions on the maximum and minimum levels of φ that allow to sustain a given
equilibrium. A higher θ provides more incentives for B to ask for ancillary services but
also more incentives for A to solicit a rating since both q(0, 0) and q(1, H) increase but
q(0, H) does not change. Hence, it favours the equilibrium with ancillary services. On
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the contrary, a lower θ favours the equilibrium without ancillary services because the
worsening of the unrated pool makes it less attractive to be a part of it.
• The parameters governing the fixed part (α1) and the variable part (α2) of the CRA’s
rating fees.
γ′(α2) > 0, hence, an increase in α2 makes γ higher and it is more likely that there is
an equilibrium with ancillary services. α2 captures the steepness in which unsolicited
ratings allow you to charge more fees per unit of debt. Hence, it works very similarly
to an increase in γ:
φ(α1, α2, D, γ) = α1 + α2γD. (14)
α2 can be interpreted as the bargaining power or the market share of the CRA. If
they are in a better position to extract more fees per unit of debt in one market; it is
reasonable that they want to take advantage of that by increasing their presence and
maximising revenues.
α1 is the fixed part of the CRA compensation, irrespective of debt and market position.
You can think of it as the minimum amount they require to rate a borrower no matter
what the circumstances. It might not compensate the CRA to issue a rating if they are
paid below a certain compensation. Condition (10) tells us that α1 has to be higher
than the cost of issuing a rating for γ′(D) > 0. I.e. the fixed part of the rating fees
has to compensate for the fixed costs of issuing a rating.
3.9 Relationship with the data
Higher average debt and high α2 give incentives to the CRA to assign more unsolicited
ratings. In the equilibrium with ancillary services, the proportion of unsolicited ratings, γ∗,
is higher, hence, the percentage of type A borrowers that get an unsolicited rating is higher.
Moreover, the percentage of unsolicited ratings over total ratings, θγ
θ+(1−θ 1
2
)
is higher than
in the equilibrium with unsolicited ratings, γ
θ+(1−θ)γ , as long as there is not a large number
of type B firms: γ < θ(1−θ)
2(1−θ−θ2) . We have seen that unsolicited ratings are frequent among
sovereign ratings and they are mostly high rating grades (stylised facts 2.1 and 2.2).
The equilibrium with a higher probability of unsolicited ratings features higher unsolicited
rating grades thanks to the opt out option provided by ancillary services (see figure 6). In the
equilibrium without ancillary services (low probability of unsolicited ratings γ∗), unsolicited
ratings are g = H and g = L (shaded areas) while in the equilibrium with ancillary services
(with high probability of unsolicited ratings γ∗) they are g = H. Hence, in the latter
equilibrium unsolicited ratings are higher on average than solicited ones. But this is not
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Figure 6: Percentage of solicited and unsolicited ratings.
necessarily true for the other equilibrium. This explains δ > 0 in the regression of sovereign
rating grades on solicitation status (table 4).14
Conditional on the rating, unsolicited ratings are associated with higher or lower yields
depending on the equilibrium. In the equilibrium with ancillary services, q(0, H)−q(1, H) >
0 and q(0, L)−q(1, L) = 0, hence, unsolicited ratings are associated with lower yields whereas
in the equilibrium without, q(0, H)−q(1, H) < 0 and q(0, L)−q(1, L) = 0, they are associated
with higher yields. High unsolicited ratings are associated with a higher q(0, H) because they
reveal a type A perfectly (type B chooses to buy ancillary services). This result is in line
with δ < 0 in the regression of sovereign yields on solicitation status (table 6).
4 Conclusion
To what extent rating agencies strategically downgrade their unsolicited ratings? The answer
to this question is relevant for policy because it matters to determine if the rating agencies
may have misbehaved. In this paper I propose a model that assumes away strategic moti-
vations for unsolicited ratings by assuming true-telling on the part of the CRA. The degree
of market selection in equilibrium depends on the market size and other market characteris-
tics. The model is, hence, able to explain both the downward bias in unsolicited ratings for
certain categories of borrowers (banks, insurance, corporates) as well as the upward bias for
sovereign borrowers.
The equilibrium with positive selection on unsolicited ratings is generated thanks to
the possibility to enter a private contract with the CRA with a confidentiality clause (e.g.
ancillary services). This also allows us to explore in which circumstances the value of opacity
14This effect would disappear if we could control perfectly for the type, which we assume we cannot do
here since it is private information.
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for some borrowers can be marketed by the CRAs. When the rating agencies cater to both
the borrowers that have incentives to be transparent as well as those that prefer opacity,
they still provide the market with valuable information but the amount of information might
be biased towards a particular group of borrowers.
An extended version of the model presented in this paper, properly calibrated, could
be able to deliver a useful benchmark for the downward natural bias as a function of the
characteristics of the market under study. Identifying the “natural size” of the market
selection bias would help to detect the presence of strategic motivation and, hence, inform
policy intervention.
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APPENDIX
A Probit models for years 2010 - 2015
Probit models for the probability of having an unsolicited rating given the rating grade, the
level of debt over GDP, GDPpc and regional fixed effects for each year between 2010 and
2015.
Table 7: Probit model
Unsolicited rating
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Rating grade 0.430 0.397* 0.185** 0.162** 0.174** 0.146*
(0.287) (0.204) (0.0809) (0.0759) (0.0815) (0.0768)
Debt 0.0411* 0.0491** 0.0312** 0.0267** 0.0270** 0.0212**
(0.0226) (0.0241) (0.0139) (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.00931)
GDPpc 0.0000414 0.0000453* 0.0000116 0.00000924 0.0000112 0.00000978
(0.0000258) (0.0000267) (0.0000186) (0.0000166) (0.0000177) (0.0000154)
Geographic dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 93 95 99 104 107 120
r2 p 0.593 0.634 0.481 0.445 0.430 0.357
chi2 32.37 34.82 29.04 31.26 30.48 26.28
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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B List of sovereigns rated unsolicitedly and compara-
ble sovereigns
C Equilibrium conditions in the model without ancil-
lary services
According to the beliefs, the lenders’ price function is the following:
q(s, σ) =

q(0, 0) = β
[
θξλA+(1−θ)(1+γ∗(ξ−1))λB
θξ+(1−θ)(1+γ∗(ξ−1))
]
q(0, H) = β
[
θλA+(1−θ)pλB
θ+(1−θ)p
]
q(0, L) = βλB
q(1, H) = βλA
q(1, L) = βλB.
(15)
The condition for s∗(A) = 1 is q(1, H)D+λA(R−D) + (1−λA)r−φ(D, γ) > q(0, 0)D+
λA(R − D) + (1 − λA)r, that is, the payoff for soliciting and obtaining a rating H with
probability 1 for a fee φ(D, γ) is higher than the payoff of remaining without a rating.
Substituting the expressions for q(·) from (15), we obtain:
φ(D, γ∗) < β
[(
1− θξ
θξ + (1− θ) (1 + γ∗(ξ − 1))
)
λA − (1− θ) (1 + γ
∗(ξ − 1))
θξ + (1− θ) (1 + γ∗(ξ − 1))λB
]
D.
On the other hand, for s∗(B) = 0, paying the fee to solicit a rating, which is H with a prob-
ability p and L with a probability 1−p, is not worth for type B: q(0, 0)D+λB(R−D)+(1−
λB)r > p [q(1, H)D + λB(R−D) + (1− λB)r]+(1−p) [q(1, L)D + λB(R−D) + (1− λB)r]−
φ(D, γ). Substituting and rearranging, we obtain the following condition:
φ(D, γ∗) > β
[(
p− θξ
θξ + (1− θ) (1 + γ∗(ξ − 1))
)
λA +
(
(1− p)− (1− θ) (1 + γ
∗(ξ − 1))
θξ + (1− θ) (1 + γ∗(ξ − 1))
)
λB
]
D
The two conditions verify the proposed equilibrium choices s∗(A) = 1 and s∗(B) = 0.
This confirms the beliefs in equilibrium and off-equilibrium beliefs µ(1, L) are free to be set
arbitrarily.
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Unsolicited Solicited
2010
France Aaa Austria Aaa
Germany Aaa Belgium Aa1
Italy Aa2 Norway Aaa
Luxembourg Aaa
Mauritius Baa2
Netherlands Aaa
Switzerland Aaa
United Kingdom Aaa
2011
France Aaa Austria Aaa
Germany Aaa Belgium Aa1
Italy Aa3
Luxembourg Aaa
Mauritius Baa2
Netherlands Aaa
Switzerland Aaa
United Kingdom Aaa
2012
France Aaa Austria Aaa
Germany Aaa Belgium Aa3
Italy Baa1 Botswana A2
Kenya B1 South Africa A3
Mauritius Baa1
Netherlands Aaa
Switzerland Aaa
United Kingdom Aaa
Zambia B1
2013
France Aa1 Austria Aaa
Germany Aaa Belgium Aa3
Italy Baa2 Botswana A2
Kenya B1 Ghana B1
Mauritius Baa1 South Africa Baa1
Mozambique B1
Netherlands Aaa
Switzerland Aaa
Uganda B1
United Kingdom Aa1
Zambia B1
2014
France Aa1 Austria Aaa
Germany Aaa Belgium Aa3
Italy Baa2 Botswana A2
Kenya B1 Ghana B2
Mauritius Baa1 South Africa Baa1
Mozambique B1
Netherlands Aaa
Switzerland Aaa
Uganda B1
United Kingdom Aa1
Zambia B1
2015
Bahrain Baa3 Austria Aaa
France Aa1 Belgium Aa3
Germany Aaa Botswana A2
Italy Baa2 South Africa Baa2
Kenya B1
Mauritius Baa1
Netherlands Aaa
Switzerland Aaa
Uganda B1
United Kingdom Aa1
Zambia B1
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D Equilibrium conditions in the model with ancillary
services
According to the beliefs, the lenders’ price function is the following:
q(s, g) =

q(0, 0) = β
[
2θξλA+(1−θ)(ξ+1)λB
2θξ+(1−θ)(ξ+1)
]
q(0, H) = βλA
q(0, L) = βλB
q(1, H) = β
[
2θ(1−ξ)(1−γ)λA+(1−θ)(1−ξ)(p+)λB
(1−ξ)[2θ(1−γ)+(1−θ)(p+)]
]
q(1, L) = βλB.
(16)
The condition for s∗(A, 0) = 1, under such beliefs, is the following: q(1, H)D + λA(R −
D) + (1− λA)r− φ(D, γ) > q(0, 0)D+ λA(R−D) + (1− λA)r. Substituting the expressions
for q(·) from (16), we obtain:
φ(D, γ∗) < β
[
2θ(1− ξ)(1− γ∗)λA + (1− θ)(1− ξ)(p+ )λB
(1− ξ) [2θ(1− γ∗) + (1− θ)(p+ )] −
2θξλA + (1− θ)(ξ + 1)λB
2θξ + (1− θ)(ξ + 1)
]
D.
(17)
The condition above is the same to guarantee s∗(A, 1) = 1, no matter whether the assessment
is m = h or m = l. Moreover, the condition for s∗(B, 1) = 1 if m = h is: (p+ )q(1, H)D +
(1− p− )q(1, L)D+ λA(R−D) + (1− λA)r− φ(D, γ) > q(0, 0)D+ λA(R−D) + (1− λA)r.
Thus,
φ(D, γ∗) < β
[
(p+ )
2θ(1− ξ)(1− γ∗)λA + (1− θ)(1− ξ)(p+ )λB
(1− ξ) [2θ(1− γ∗) + (1− θ)(p+ )] + (1− p− )λB−
(18)
−2θξλA + (1− θ)(ξ + 1)λB
2θξ + (1− θ)(ξ + 1)
]
D := φ¯.
Since λB < λA, condition (18) is more restrictive than condition (17). If type B wants to
solicit a rating after an assessment m = h, then type A wants to solicit a rating as well.
On the other hand, for s∗(B, 0) = 0, paying the fee to solicit a rating, which is H with a
probability p and L with a probability 1−p, is not worth for type B: q(0, 0)D+λB(R−D)+(1−
λB)r > p [q(1, H)D + λB(R−D) + (1− λB)r]+(1−p) [q(1, L)D + λB(R−D) + (1− λB)r]−
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φ(D, γ). Substituting and rearranging, we obtain the following condition:
φ(D, γ∗) > β
[
p
2θ(1− ξ)(1− γ∗)λA + (1− θ)(1− ξ)(p+ )λB
(1− ξ) [2θ(1− γ∗) + (1− θ)(p+ )] + (1− p)λB− (19)
−2θξλA + (1− θ)(ξ + 1)λB
2θξ + (1− θ)(ξ + 1)
]
D.
And, if they receive a negative assessment m = l, type B prefers again not to solicit a rating
s∗(B, 1) = 0: q(0, 0)D+λB(R−D)+(1−λB)r > (p−) [q(1, H)D + λB(R−D) + (1− λB)r]+
(1− p+ ) [q(1, L)D + λB(R−D) + (1− λB)r]− φ(D, γ). Thus,
φ(D, γ∗) > β
[
(p− )2θ(1− ξ)(1− γ
∗)λA + (1− θ)(1− ξ)(p+ )λB
(1− ξ) [2θ(1− γ∗) + (1− θ)(p+ )] + (1− p+ )λB−
(20)
−2θξλA + (1− θ)(ξ + 1)λB
2θξ + (1− θ)(ξ + 1)
]
D := φ.
Since  > 0, if θ(D, γ∗) satisfies condition (19) it also satisfies (20) .
Conditions (18) and (19) verify the proposed equilibrium choices. These choices confirm
the equilibrium beliefs.
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